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INTRODUCTION 1
Mark Robinson
It is almost six years since the good government
agenda first surfaced as a prominent aid policy con-
cern. Initially, the concerns of the academic and
aid policy communities centred on the broader con-
text which conditioned the form and content of this
agenda, and on the different definitions employed
by various aid donors.2 The debate has since moved
on, and two significant developments merit par-
ticular attention. The first is a shift in emphasis
from negative or 'punitive' approaches, to a range of
interventions in which sanctions have been replaced
by positive aid measures and less threatening in-
ducements to political and administrative reform.
The second noteworthy feature is that donors have
now accumulated significant experience in this
field and have adopted a range of approaches and
organizational procedures to enable them to imple-
ment good government programmes in a more
systematic and informed fashion.3
1 NEW CONCERNS
A change in emphasis from the selective application
of punitive measures through political condition-
ality to a more widespread use of positive forms
of support has been a significant development in
recent years. Political conditionality found favour
with aid donors in the early 1990s as the preferred
mechanism for encouraging recipient governments
to introduce governance reforms. This made the
provision of aid conditional on the willingness of
governments to respect human rights, demonstrate
progress on political reform, and overhaul their
administrative procedures. Experience has shown
that political conditionality has been applied fairly
infrequently and in a limited number of countries.
lt has proved effective in promoting political reform
when applied by donors acting collectively, espe-
cially in aid dependent countries in sub-Saharan
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Z This Bulletin is a successor to the volume published more than
two years previously (Moore 1993a) which was concerned with
exploring the origins and the content of the new donor agenda and
the experience to date in putting it into practice.
Africa, but elections have not always produced a
change in government, as the case of Kenya vividly
demonstrated. Some donors have acted unilaterally
in applying aid sanctions to particular countries, but
such actions have had little effect and, in some cases,
have proved counter-productive. There is also a
problem of credibility: countries which have been
persuaded to opt for political reform through such
pressure have not been rewarded with large
increases in aid, which has fostered resentment
and cynicism about donor motives among aid
recipients.
These types of problems have encouraged donors to
concentrate their efforts on promoting governance
reforms through incremental, small-scale, measures
in the form of support for civil society associations,
strengthening the electoral process and promoting
constitutional reform in preference to the negative
approach implicit in political conditionality. Some
donors, notably the Canadian government, have
abandoned conditionality as a means to achieve
political reform, and now focus their efforts exclu-
sively on positive aid measures. Others, like the
French, place less emphasis on the need for demo-
cratic reform as a pre-condition for development
assistance. Political conditionality continues to be
used, but usually as a last resort when conven-
tional diplomatic approaches have failed, and in
a more covert manner, without public declarations
of intent.4
Another development since the agenda was first
mooted lies in the improved capacity of aid donors
to implement governance programmes. Most offi-
cial aid agencies have adapted their internal organi-
zation in response to the policy emphasis given to
good government and democracy promotion. In
some cases this has involved the creation of a new
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division, as in the case of SIDA, or the marginal
reorganization and expansion of an existing depart-
ment. In NORAD it has involved the creation of a
network of staff from different divisions who are
responsible for formulating and coordinating good
government initiatives. Democracy assistance work
sponsored by USAID is largely the responsibility of
a Centre for Democracy and Governance estab-
lished under the Clinton administration. Several
donors have hired specialists in the fields of political
science and public administration; for instance,
USAID has established a network of governance
advisers stationed in its field offices to advise on the
design and implementation of regional governance
programmes.
Despite these organizational innovations, aid
agency capacity for the appraisal and design of
good government interventions is still limited. There
is no established method for surveying good
government requirements in particular country or
regional settings, to identify key areas of need and
inform aid allocation decisions. Nor are there tried
and tested procedures for eliciting the viewpoints of
recipient governments and potential counterparts
in civil society which might be expected to assume
responsibility for implementing good government
initiatives; consultation mechanisms are remark-
ably under-developed in view of the emphasis on
accountability and transparency in the good gov-
ernment agenda. Part of the problem lies in the
absence of suitably qualified individuals to carry
out work of a sensitive political nature; most
political scientists with relevant country expertise
are not very conversant with aid agency procedures
or policy priorities while evaluators and consultants
who work on a regular basis for aid agencies lack the
depth of insight and disciplinary background that
the task requires. A related problem is the difficulty
of devising an approach which can be applied in
diverse country settings, since by their very nature,
good government initiatives will need to be country
specific in order to incorporate and respond to a
particular set of cultural and historical circumstances
that condition their potential effectiveness.
There is also the question of whether official aid
agencies are adequately equipped to implement
good government programmes. In the more con-
ventional area of civil service reform, there is
extensive experience of planning and implementing
such programmes. But in the newer areas of sup-
port for civil society organizations and democracy
promotion experience is much more limited and
aid agencies rely on third parties for much of the
design and implementation work. Many of these
programmes are small-scale and extremely varied
in their character and objectives, and contain high
levels of risk and uncertainty, unlike the majority of
aid interventions that official aid donors are familiar
with. For this reason, intermediate organizations
such as NGOs, political foundations, and training
institutes tend to be the preferred vehicles for per-
forming this task, but even here experience is
mixed and little is known about the impact and
effectiveness of their work in the governance do-
main. Political foundations have often suffered
from confusion over their status and suspicion over
their motives and allegiances. NGOs have exten-
sive experience in the areas of service delivery and
the provision of humanitarian assistance, but few
are geared up to implement democracy assistance
and good government programmes. Overall, more
information is required on the competence of
various implementing agencies and the range of
delivery mechanisms for good government inter-
ventions and several of the articles in this Bulletin
directly address these questions.
With these developments in mind, the various
contributions in this volume focus on three main
issues: questions of definition and content, the
de'velopmental consequences of democracy, and
experience with implementing the good govern-
ment agenda. They draw on the results of completed
or on-going research at IDS, by political scientists
and sociologists concerned with governance and
democracy issues. Also included are contributions
by researchers in Germany and the United States to
provide critical insights on the approach and expe-
riences of particular aid donors. Finally, as a means
of illuminating the operational concerns of a major
actor in the governance field, two staff members at
the World Bank provide their assessment of the
Bank's work to date in this area.
2 DEFINITIONS: THE GOOD GOVERNMENT
AGENDA
Much of the interest in good government when it
first appeared on the donor policy agenda was in the
definitions ascribed to it by different donors. In the
Introduction to the previous volume of the Bulletin
on good government Mick Moore (1993b) distin-
guished two main currents reflecting the respective
concerns of the World Bank on the one hand and
bilateral donors on the other. The former was essen-
tially preoccupied with questions of financial ac-
countability and administrative efficiency, whereas
the latter were interested in wider, more political,
concerns bound up with democracy, human rights
and participation. in this volume, Stevens and
Gnariaselvam discern some degree of convergence
between the two positions, reflected in the willing-
ness of the World Bank to acknowledge, at least
conceptually, the significance of the form of the
political regime from a governance perspective, and
growing recognition on the part of bilateral donors
of the importance of probity and competence in
economic policy management. Despite this conver-
gence, a distinction is sometimes made between the
traditional agenda of institutional development and
capacity building (covered by Moore and Stevens
and Gnanaselvam), and a newer agenda represented
by democratization, decentralization, demilitariza-
lion, strengthening civil society and the promotion
of human rights (see the contributions by Carothers,
Luckham, Manor and Robinson). However, this
distinction is perhaps over-stated, since proponents
of the former would point to new concerns such as
accountability and transparency, and aid agency
concern with human rights predates the governance
agenda by a number of years.
Several documents recently published by aid donors
attest to this broad convergence in thinking about
good government. One of the most important of
these, is the DAC Orientations on Participatory
Development and Good Governance, published
in 1994 by the OECD, which is indicative of the
general stance of the bilateral aid donors. It provides
the focus for the article by Peter Nunnenkamp, in
which he subjects the various topics covered by the
DAC paper to critical scrutiny. While endorsing the
broad agenda, Nunnenkamp draws attention to a
number of inconsistencies between participatory
development and the efficiency of aid projects on
the one hand, since the former can entail a time-
consuming negotiation process, and democratiza-
tion and good governance on the other in the light
of East Asian experience. The agenda is further
complicated by public sector reform, in which there
is a conflict between calls for a reduction in the size
of government and the need for competent gov-
ernments to be sufficiently strong to withstand well
organized pressure groups, which are seeking
greater participation in decision making. Mick
oore highlights another area of analytical confu-
sion, namely that concerning institution building,
which he argues is an extremely elusive and prob-
lematic concept, which should be dispensed with in
favour of terms with further precise and identifiable
meanings. Nunnenkamp argues that ambiguities
and inconsistencies in the donor agenda are prob-
lematic in that they do not easily translate into
coherent strategies to guide aid policy and practice,
and can undermine the credibility of donor
intentions.
Robert Jenkins also addresses some of these con-
ceptual tensions in his examination of the political
management of structural adjustment in India.
Here we have an example of a long-standing liberal
democracy which has sustained the momentum of
economic reforms in a volatile political environment.
This was not achieved by means of transparent
and accountable government, but rather through
astute political manoeuvring by political leaders
using well honed Machiavellian tactics to assuage
potential sources of opposition and to promote in-
cremental change while maintaining an appearance
of continuity. Central to this political capacity is a
federal political system which permits reformers in
central government to spread the burden of conflict
resolution over a wider institutional base, by involv-
ing state governments in mediating conflicts of
interest over liberalization measures at a more local-
ized level. Although India's success in managing
the implementation of politically sensitive reforms
demonstrates the virtues of liberal democracy, it
also suggests that competence and transparency are
not necessarily natural bedfellows.
A further consequence of convergence in thinking
among donors is that linkages between good gov-
ernment and other elements of the development
agenda are not well established. This is most readily
apparent in the lack of convergence between the
governance and the poverty agendas of the World
Bank. Anne Marie Goetz and David O'Brien show
how the governance agenda has been developed in
almost complete isolation from the World Bank's
work on poverty reduction. The governance agenda
is dominated by concerns with the efficiency and
accountability of public institutions (see Stevens
and Gnanaselvam in this volume), while the pov-
erty agenda is preoccupied with labour-intensive
growth, improved service provision and safety nets,
with minimal attention to the need to reorient public
institutions to respond to the interests of the poor,
although the latter is a central concern in the DAC's
approach to good governance. Both agendas are
criticized for failing to address political issues
underlying distributional inequalities, which are
sidelined in favour of a managerial approach to
governance and poverty reduction. This failure to
acknowledge the centrality of politics is also touched
on by Jenkins, who argues that more attention should
be given to linkages between national, sub-national
and local political arenas which can share the
burden of conflict resolution in the interests of
promoting political stability.
Another angle on definitional issues is brought out
in my own contribution on donor efforts to
strengthen civil society in developing countries. In
line with a pluralist definition of democracy, the
erriphasis is ort civil society as a neutral terrain,
where organized interests try to influence the state
and its policy choices. A failure to acknowledge the
existence of conflict in civil society, in which power-
ful groups can subvert democracy for self-interested
ends, can result in external interventions which
heighten societal tensions and retard democratic
development.
A final point to note is that there has been precious
little input into the discussion on what constitutes
good government by aid recipients, which has mostly
taken place within the donor countries and official
aid agencies. However, the good government de-
bate is no longer confined to donors, and NGOs
have increasingly sought to influence the content of
the policy agenda, by highlighting the linkages
between development concerns and human rights,
defined broadly to include social and economic as
well as civil and political rights (Clayton 1994).
3 DEMOCRATIZATION: CONSEQUENCES FOR
DEVELOPMENT
Much of the governance debate has centred on the
prospects for democratic development and what
donors can do to promote democratization in devel-
oping countries. The second question is addressed
more fully in the next section, but two of the contri-
butions examine the developmental consequences
of democracy. Much the initial impetus behind
donor concern with democracy (especially among
the bilateral agencies) stemmed from policy re-
sponses to a wave of political transitions in Eastern
Europe and Africa from the late 1980s (Robinson
1993), and its momentum has been sustained by
three principal factors: a strong perception among
some donors, notably the United States, that
democracy in developing countries serves national
security interests (see Carothers in this volume); an
association of democracy with positive develop-
ment outcomes; and the belief that democracy is
desirable in its own right. All these factors underpin
the arguments put forward by the DAC and bilateral
donors in their rationale for including democratiza-
tion within the governance agenda.
A prior question concerns the extent to which
there has been a genuine transition to democracy in
countries in Africa and elsewhere which rejected
authoritarianism as a result of a series of popular
upsurges against military dictatorships and auto-
cratic civilian regimes. Robin Luckham raises seri-
ous doubts about this process in his contribution,
arguing that relatively few African countries have
been able to consolidate democratic rule since un-
dergoing political transition. He points out that
even among these countries, several continue to be
plagued by military indiscipline and civil unrest
which provide no certainty that the fragile process
of democratization will be sustained. Elsewhere,
democratic reforms have been coopted by existing
ruling élites or stalled by authoritarian regimes
which have been unwilling to cede power to elected
civilians which underlines the centrality of ongoing
struggles by domestic groups to consolidate demo-
cracy. These qualifications also cast some doubt
over the unalloyed optimism exhibited by some
donors in their desire to see democracy spread and
take root in Africa as the panacea to the continent's
economic and political misfortunes.
Returning to the first of the two questions raised
earlier, even where there have been genuine moves
towards democratic governance, what are the con-
sequences for development? Jenkins provides an
upbeat assessment of the importance of multi-
party democracy in India based on the ability of
the regime to manage politically sensitive economic
reforms using the advantages conferred by a federal-
ism and a mature political society under established
liberal democracy. At the same time, he cautions
against attempts to replicate virtues of India's
political system in other contexts, arguing that
democracy in India is both historically contingent
and shaped by the form of the state in the post-
independence period.
Two of the contributions challenge the increasingly
widespread assumption that there is a positive
relationship between democracy and development.
Gordon White questions the validity of this assump-
tion, arguing that there are at least four conflicting
viewpoints: first, liberal democracy is a powerful
stimulus to development, because it is conducive to
market-led approach and creates the conditions
for more efficient government; second, democracy
is desirable in the longer term but is a potential
impediment in the earlier stages of development;
third, one should not expect too much from de-
mo-cracy since legitimacy derives less from per-
formance and more from respect for democratic
procedures; and fourth, the view that it is state
capacity and governance rather than the nature of
the political regime which is the central issue. Both
White and Nunnenkamp emphasize the significance
of the East Asian experience in this regard, in that
development success preceded democratic transi-
tion, which in turn questions a fundamental tenet of
the governance agenda, namely the belief that
competence in economic affairs is exclusively the
prerogative of liberal democracies, But this is not
to dismiss the potential that democracy might have
for promoting development; rather it signals the
need to actively 'design' a state that is both de-
velopmental and democratic, where development
is not simply couched in terms of economic growth,
but in which poverty, distributional justice and
environmental sustainability figure as prominent
concerns linking both components. The notion of
agency takes us on to the second question, namely
what is the role of donors and other actors in helping
to design developmental democracies? This is
addressed by a number of contributors to this
Bulletin who review experience with the implemen-
tation of the donor agenda on democracy and good
government, by examining concrete approaches in
this field.
4 IMPLEMENTATION: EXPERIENCE WITH
DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE
PROGRAMMES
A distinction was made earlier between more tradi-
tional approaches encapsulated in institutional
development and administrative reform and a set
of measures designed to promote democracy and
strengthen civic associations. In practice Moore
argues that positive support for good government
embraces a wide variety of projects designed to
improve the institutional capacity of various types
of organizations and institutions. These include
the following: state administrative machinery;
state policy making units; political parties; human
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rights organizations; civil society organizations;
legislative, electoral and judicial institutions; the
police and security services; and the mass media.
Although democracy promotion is relatively new
to many bilateral aid agencies in Europe, it has
figured as an aid policy concern in the United States
since the early 1980s. As Thomas Carothers shows
in his contribution, the promotion of democracy
was closely tied to anti-communism in the Reagan
years, but was given greater emphasis by Bush
and then Clinton with the end of the Cold War.
Democracy assistance programmes are designed
to support electoral processes, promote judicial
reform, strengthen civic associations, and enhance
civic and political education. Much of this is chan-
nelled through NGOs and specialist foundations,
but with an increase in official funding for demo-
cracy promotion, USAID is becoming increasingly
involved in such initiatives. This has given rise to
concerns that too many US organizations are now
active in this field, that there is insufficient evidence
on the impact of democracy assistance programmes,
and that programmes were poorly conceived,
because they failed to take into account the com-
plexities of the democratization process.
One area of democracy assistance that has com-
manded considerable attention among donors, is
the potential for consolidating democracy through
support for civil society organizations, which are
taken to include trade unions, churches and reli-
gious organizations, business and professional as-
sociations, and mass organizations representing
women, youth and students. As Carothers argues,
this approach has particular appeal in the United
States, where non-partisan political activity is
treated as an intrinsic and highly desirable feature
of domestic politics. It has also caught on with other
donors who are busily devising programmes to
strengthen civil society organizations but without
much idea of their likely impact. In his contribution
Mark Robinson considers the potential pitfalls of
this type of assistance, arguing that donors are not
well equipped at present to design and implement
such programmes. He points out that while strength-
ening civil society is a laudable objective, donors
need to adopt a cautious and incremental approach
in order to avoid undermining the autonomy and
legitimacy of recipient organizations, since they
cannot readily absorb large amounts of funding and
it takes time for the fruits of their endeavours to
become apparent.
Donors are also taking an interest in the contribu-
tion that aid can make to demilitarization, but expe-
rience in this area is still fairly limited. Luckham
argues that there is limited scope for donors to
push for military cuts through aid conditionality,
since countries which spend large amounts on the
military tend to be resistant to external pressures for
military reform. There are more positive measures
that donors can adopt to promote military reform,
including support for demobilization and attempts
to professionalize military and security establish-
ments, but such efforts have been sporadic and
donors have to avoid forms of support which aggra-
vate underlying political conflicts. Stevens and
Gnanaselvam also address the question of military
expenditure in their contribution. While acknowl-
edging that hígh military expenditure crowds out
spending on social services and infrastructure, they
argue that it might be more productive to focus on
the process by which military budgets are deter-
mined (for example by encouraging wider public
debate, publication of detailed financial accounts
and strengthening political oversight of the budget-
ary process) rather than on finding ways to reduce
expenditure per se.
Two of the contributions highlight the importance
of measures designed to strengthen capacity at
lower levels of the political system in order tobroaden
political participation and spread the burden of
conflict resolution. Jenkins' observations on the re-
silience of India's federal political system have
already been touched upon in this regard. James
Manor reports on the results of comparative
research in two African and two Asian countries
to demonstrate the benefits and limitations of de-
centralization for the promotion of democratic
governance. The positive attributes of democratic
decentralization are that it can encourage greater
political participation and increased responsiveness
on the part of government institutions. It can also
improve the performance of government institu-
tions by increasing information flows, reducing
absenteeism and, under certain circumstances, by
helping to curb corruption. But decentralization
also falls short of expectations on a number of
counts. For instance, it is unrealistic to expect
decentralization to facilitate bottom-up planning.
Nor is it realistic to expect decentralization to
contribute to efforts to promote local-level re-
source mobilization. Finally, and perhaps most
disappointingly, decentralization was not found
to have enhanced the effectiveness of government
institutions in alleviating poverty and assisting
vulnerable groups. In view of the difficulties en-
countered in making decentralization work well,
Manor emphasizes the importance of two factors:
decentralized institutions must be accountable and
elected councils require an adequate level of
resourcing to enable them to function effectively.
In his contribution Moore examines aid agency
experience with institutional capacity building, or
what is more commonly known as institutional
development. Most positive support for good gov-
ernment is centred on institutional development,
but experience shows that institution building
activities have proved problematic for aid agen-
cies. Moore makes four claims in support of this
contention: despite long experience in this field,
the achievements have not been very impressive;
conventional methods of delivering technical assist-
ance for institution building have been widely
discredited; there is considerable uncertainty and
disagreement on the meaning of the term; and the
successful promotion of institutional development
may require donors to intervene directly in the
affairs of recipient nations. From this experience
Moore concludes that aid agencies will need to
become more deeply involved by improving their
knowledge of the political context in which they
are working, and to pay more attention to political
analysis in project design. By implication, new
models of delivering technical assistance are also
required, with long term twinning relationships
between organizations as the only substantial
alternative available.
The final contribution in this volume is by two
staff members at the World Bank, who reflect, in a
personal capacity, on the World Bank's experience
in this complex and difficult field. Three particular
features stand out, which are indicative of how the
governance agenda has moved on since it was first
mooted. First, although the Bank is principally
concerned with the economic and social dimensions
of governance, its remit now extends well beyond
narrow concerns of administrative effectiveness to
embrace legal reform, participation, human rights,
military expenditure and corruption. Second, while
its mandate prohibits explicit consideration of
political considerations in lending decisions, recog-
nition is given to the form of the political regime
in giving practical application to the governance
concept, even though human rights and democracy
are largely seen as the prerogative of the bilateral
donors, Third, the governance concept was initially
conceived in relation to institutional and political
weaknesses in developing countries but in the face
of public criticism, especially from northern
NGOs, of the lack of transparency in the World
Bank's own operating procedures, measures have
been taken to make the Bank a more open and
accountable institution. These have taken the form
of a more active disclosure policy on country reports
and project documents, and improvements in the
Bank's internal management procedures.
5 CONCLUDING REMARKS
In view of the content and breadth of the contri-
butions to this Bulletin it is difficult to find a satis-
factory way of pulling together common threads
and policy lessons. All are concerned with various
strands of the aid policy agenda embraced by good
government, either in terms of definitions, its de-
velopmental consequences and experience of imple-
mentation. lt is striking that while many of the
contributions highlight problems encountered by
donors in implementing the agenda few question
its underlying premises and legitimacy, even though
some commentators remain sceptical about donor
motives (Leftwich 1993, Jeffries 1993). Most con-
tributors recognize the implicit virtues of democracy
and good government, but there is considerable
doubt expressed about the capacity of aid donors to
satisfy their high expectations in relation to the
successful realization of governance policy objec-
tives, either because they are perceived to lack the
requisite skills and orientation, or because the politi-
cal obstacles are more formidable than commonly
anticipated.
In contrast to the expectations of many commen-
tators (including a number of contributors to the
previous volume of the Bulletin dealing with good
government), the tenor of this volume suggests that
the governance agenda is here to stay, and indeed
it has persisted longer than many of its detractors
originally anticipated. As experience of implement-
ing democracy and governance programmes
accumulates, a greater sense of realism is likely to
be injected into aid agency objectives, and a longer»
term perspective may gradually emerge. But this
is likely to conflict with the desire to demonstrate
quick results, especially in aid agencies under
pressure from sceptical publics and governments
contemplating cutbacks in foreign aid programmes.
Moreover, now that the euphoria which greeted
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the wave of political transitions in Africa and
elsewhere in the developing world has begun to
recede in the face of democratic reversals or blocked
transitions, donors will need to be less sanguine
about the potential impact and sustainability of
externally induced transition and positive aid meas-
ures. This might necessitate a more focused ap-
proach, in which countries that hold real prospects
for democratic consolidation are singled out for
positive forms of assistance along with increased
levels of con-ventional development aid, and where
regimes which have transgressed democratic norms
and procedures, or abused human rights in a gross
and sustained manner, are subject to reductions in
development assistance and various forms of aid
conditionality.
However, broad support for the overall thrust of
the policy agenda (or at least agreement on the
desirability of democratic development and more
open and accountable government) does not imply
endorsement of the definitions and approaches cur-
rently employed by aid donors. Indeed, several of
the contributions reveal sharp disagreement with
the prevailing orthodoxy. If anything unites the
various contributions, certainly those from outside
a donor perspective, it is that current approaches
fail to recognize the centrality of politics and power,
and by extension, the importance of political analy-
sis in deepening the agenda and in enhancing its
potential impact. Much of the agenda continues
to be couched in neutral terminology which both
obscures conflict and underestimates political re-
sistance from vested interests opposed to demo-
cratic development and the dilution of power and
domination that it necessarily implies. This is of
course understandable from the point of view of
the rei1po1itik of aid transactions, where the pro-
vision of aid rests on delicate government to govern-
ment negotiations. But it does not obviate the need
for improved capacity for political assessment and
political analysis in project design: without this
many interventions are destined to founder and
fall short of their ambitious objectives.
There are several components of the governance
agenda which have not received adequate treat-
ment in this Bulletin, but which will receive due
consideration in ongoing or future work of various
contributors. First is the absence of a gender per-
spective and the potential insights that it can offer
with a view to widening the governance agenda:
although it receives only scant attention here, it is
a central theme of the next Bulletin which focuses
on gender and institutions. A second omission is
that of global governance, which forms the theme
of the report prepared by a special Commission
under Danish Prime Minister Ingvar Carlssori and
released for public consumption as this Bulletin was
being completed. Concerns with transparency and
accountability of international organizations (espe-
cially the UN and the Bretton Woods institutions),
and global economic policy management have not
figured prominently in this volume but will con-
tinue to inform the work of contributors concerned
with broadening and deepening the governance
agenda. Third, Eastern European and developing
country perspectives are notable by their absence
here: greater involvement by researchers from these
two regions in this agenda is clearly an essential
prerequisite for widening existing knowledge on
the impact and consistency of governance and de-
mocracy programmes, and opportunities must be
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